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A father whose 19 year old son was executed by the Government’s 
security forces in connection with the Al-Sadr uprising of 1999 
reflected on his strong desire for revenge but concluded: 
“That is not the way…I have seen my life and I have buried my 
son…I want justice.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
With the questioning of Saddam Hussein in front of the Iraqi High Criminal Court2 on October 19, 
2005,3 a trial began that has been labelled by some as “the trial of the century4”. Whether this is true 
or not, the proceedings in Baghdad receive high publicity and are under close scrutiny by major 
human rights organisations5, legal experts6, and indeed the general public, as the news coverage is 
extensive. Why does the trial attract so much attention one may wonder and why do so many people 
care about ensuring fair proceedings for an ex-dictator on trial for major human rights violations, a 
dictator that himself made extensive use of a special Revolutionary Court guaranteeing fast 
executions but by no means due process of law.
1
 Human Rights Watch, Ali Hassan Majid and the Basra Massacre of 1999, February 2005, at 23; Human Rights Watch 
Briefing Paper, at 18, available at: http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraq1005/index.htm. (All Websites quoted last 
visited: April 16, 2006).
2 The court was formerly known as Iraqi Special Tribunal, it has subsequently been renamed.
3
“Hussein’s First Trial is Opening but Clarity May Still be Far Off”, New York Times, October 18, 2005, at A1. 
4 See Michael Scharf, “Grotian Moment: The Hussein Trial Blog”, “Is the Saddam Hussein Trial one of the most 
important trials of all time?” Issue # 10, at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/ ;“The Trial of the Century”, CBS 
News, April 22, 2006,available at: 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/15/news/opinion/courtwatch/main588751.shtml. 
5 See Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, supra note 1; “Iraq – Iraqi Special Tribunal – Fair trials not guaranteed”, 
Amnesty International, available at: 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/iraq/document.do?id=82AFEE4B414DC6D180256FE90052E0E1
6 See e.g. “Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog”, supra note 4; Ash Ü Bali, “Justice under Occupation, 
Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in Iraq”, 30 Yale J. Int`l L. 431-472 ; M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Post-
Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special Tribunal” Cornell Int`l L.J. 101-166; Michael A. Newton,”The 
Iraqi Special Tribunal: A Human Rights Perspective”, available at: 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Newton_Article_on_the_IST.pdf.  
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In answering this question the optimistic legal scholars might first of all point to the fact that - as 
will be discussed later - international law requires a fair trial and for those who believe in the rule of 
law, this will indeed be an important reason to turn their eyes towards Baghdad. 
But there is more to it. The trial held in the fortified “Green Zone” in the middle of Baghdad is 
special in many ways. 
First there is the hope that this trial might serve as a model for Iraq and might help to re-establish 
trust in the judicial system and its protection against the deprivation of rights which has been 
strongly eroded by the past 23 years of Saddam’s reign and to thereby allow the country a “new 
start” based on firm legal principles. In order to help Iraq through the very delicate transition phase,
shifting away from a violent suppressive dictatorship towards a fragile new democracy, the trial will 
need to open avenues for reconciliation, provide justice for those whose rights were violated and 
publicly acknowledge the atrocities that have happened in the past decades.7
Further more by holding Saddam accountable, the current criminal proceedings add yet another 
name to the list of recent precedents in which heads of state had to face charges for violating 
international law.8  The trial might thereby serve as another mosaic stone in establishing the rule of 
law and deter others from stepping over the lines drawn by international agreements and custom in 
the area of international criminal law.
7
 See also Goldstone, “The Trial of Saddam Hussein: What Kind of Court Should Prosecute Saddam Hussein And 
Others For Human Rights Abuses?”,  27 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1490, 2003-2004 at 1503-1504.
8 See the proceedings against General Pinochet in Spain and Chile, against Slobodan Milosevic in front of the ICTY, the 
Ex Rwandan Prime Minister Kambanda in front of the ICTR and now against former Liberian Head of State Charles 
Taylor in front of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
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However, the trial is also being perceived as closely connected to the heavily criticised U.S. led 
invasion of Iraq that has been claimed by many to infringe international law9 and was founded on 
assumptions which turned out to be false.10 As the U.S. played a major part in setting up the 
tribunal, the trial is in danger of at least being perceived as “victor’s justice” and mere show by the 
world audience, finding guilty a dictator who by many - including high officials such as the Iraqi 
President Jalal Talabani or the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Army President Bush - has already 
been declared guilty. 11
To establishing model proceedings in Iraq and avoid mock trial’s the trial needs to be fair. It has 
been said that in light of Saddam’s past it would be bitterly ironic to transform him into the “poster 
boy for fair trials and due process,”12 which might be true. Nevertheless, it is necessary to do so, in 
order to establish a trustworthy and fair judicial system in Iraq, displaying that any accused, even 
one considered guilty by so many for the most heinous crimes, will receive a fair trial and be 
presumed innocent until otherwise proven.
There is a lot at risk in Iraq at the moment and the world audience is watching. Whether the 
proceedings in front of the Iraqi High Criminal Court are fair and legitimate and whether the trial in 
Baghdad is the soundest solution to achieve the aforementioned objectives is the subject of this 
paper. In addressing it, the factual background will be provided first, followed by the legal analysis. 
9 S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002) did not authorize the use of force by the coalition as it did not authorize 
the use of “all  necessary means”, the term commonly employed by the Security Council under Chapter VII. For a 
discussion of the legality of the U.S led invasion see e.g : Bellamy, Alex J. “International Law and the War with Iraq”, 4 
Melb J. Int`l L. 497 (2003).
10
 „U.S. Gives Up Search For Iraq WMD”, BBC News, January, 12, 2005, available under:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4169107.stm.
11 Jalal Talabani: “Saddam Hussein  is a war criminal and he deserves to be executed 20 times a day  for his crimes 
against humanity”, Chicago Tribune,  “Talabani Says Saddam Confessed to Crimes”, AP, Published September 7, 
2005; Georg W. Bush: “This is a disgusting tyrant who deserves justice, the ultimate justice”, BBC News, December 
17, 2003,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3326311.stm. See also Abdul Aziz Hakim, leader of the largest political 
party in Iraq: “This criminal deserves the death penalty, the highest punishment” Washington Post,  “At Chaotic Trial of 
Hussein Iraqi Victims Tell of Torture”,  December 6, 2005, at A22.12
Law Prof. Linda Malone "it is ironic to anyone watching this trial that Hussein, who is such an  icon of injustice, is 
now trying to transform himself into the poster boy for fair trials and due process.", in “Law Experts Divided Over 
Legitimacy of Tribunal”, Los Angeles Times, October 20, 2005.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A) THE INVASION OF IRAQ AND THE INSTALLATION OF THE COURT
To be able to asses the legitimacy of the Court’s installation, it is important to keep the timeline of 
the invasion in mind: A U.S. led coalition began its military action against Iraq on March 19, 2003.13
Very short after that, on May 1, 2003, the end of major combat operations was declared by U.S. 
President George W. Bush which was followed by a formal occupation of Iraq. After transferral of 
the power to the Interim Government on June 28, 2004, the U.S. declared an official end to the
occupation on June 30, 2004. Elections on January 30, 2005, resulted in the construction of a 
Transitional National Assembly, which drafted an Iraqi constitution that was adopted by vote on 15,
October 2005.14 Elections for an Iraqi government finally took place on December 15, 2005.
The Court was installed during the ongoing occupation of Iraq. Only a few days prior to Saddam’s 
capture by Coalition Forces on December 13, 200315 the Iraqi Governing Council authorized by, in 
cooperation with and subject to the approval of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) - the 
administrative body created by the coalition as the occupying power - promulgated the Statute of the 
Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) on December 10, 2003.16 The Iraqi Governing Council as the 
promulgating body consisted of Iraqi members handpicked by the CPA.17
13 For the following see: “Timeline Iraq, a chronology of key events”, BBC News, available under: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/737483.stm. 
14 See “Iraq voters back new constitution”, BBC World News, October 25, 2005, available under:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4374822.stm. 
15 BBC “Saddam Hussein captured December 2003”, available under  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_iraq_timeline/html/saddam_captured.stm
16 See: Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 48 with IST Statut as Appendix A , available under : 
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/#Orders; see also: Bassiouni, “Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq”, Cornell Int’l L.J. 101, 
at 119-20.
17
“Hussein’s Lawyers Aim to Focus on Occupation”, Wall Street Journal, Oct.2, 2005, at A 9B.
Saddam Hussein on Trial – A Legal Analysis 
7
The U.S. has further been involved through the Department of Defence’s Regime Crimes Liaison 
Office, which has played a major role in the tribunal’s installation by training judges and 
prosecutors, building courtrooms, providing resources and personnel for investigations or evidence 
gathering and by training the court’s staff.18 The U.S. provided for the tribunal’s funding and spend 
U.S. $ 75 million dollars19 to install and support it, a sum that has since risen to U.S. $ 128 million.20
On August 11, 2005, the elected Iraqi Transitional Assembly revoked the original IST Statute and 
adopted an amended version, which also changed the courts name to Iraqi Higher Criminal Court
(IHCC).21
Saddam’s trial finally began in the trial chamber on October 19, 2005 in which all defendants pled 
non guilty. During that time Baghdad was, and to the present time still is, constantly shaken by 
terrorist attacks which have not halted before the court room doors. Only a day into the trial, on 
October 20, 2005, one of the defence lawyers for Awad Hamed al-Bander,22 former chief justice of 
the Iraqi Revolutionary Court who is also on trial before the court, was kidnapped by a group of 
armed men and found shot dead later the same day. A few weeks later on Nov. 8, 2005 two other 
lawyers representing Saddam’s co defendants were attacked, one of them killed, the other one 
seriously wounded.23 This attack brought the number of killings associated with the court up to 8, 
including one of its judges.24
18
 Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 121-22; Leila Sadat, “Indigenous Solution or (U.S.) Occupation Court ?”, at 2,  available 
at : http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Leila_Sadat_Indigenous_Solution_or_(U.S.)_Occupation_Court.pdf .
19 See Wall Street Journal, supra note 17, at A 9B.
20 See Leila Sadat, supra note 18, at 2; Human Rights Watch, Briefing paper, supra note 1, at 17;£ 1.2 million were 
additionally provided by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, see UK FCO, Frequently Asked Questions on Iraq 
available under http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1024313967149
21
 There seems to be some confusion conc. the correct English translation of the court’s Arabic name, whereas the 
unofficial English translation available under http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/content.asp?id=2 refers to the court 
as Iraqi High Criminal Court (the expression used in this paper), Human Rights watch calls it: Supreme Iraqi Criminal 
Tribunal, Human Rights Watch Briefing paper, supra note 1;  the New York Times refer to it as the Iraqi High 
Tribunal, N.Y. Times, “Ambush of Defense Lawyers In Hussein Trial Kills One”, November 8, 2005, at A8
22
 See Trial Watch under: http://www.trial-ch.org/trialwatch/profiles/en/facts/p407.html. 
23
“Ambush of Defense Lawyers In Hussein Trial Kills One”, N.Y. Times, November 9, 2005, at A8.
24 id. 
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While the U.S. occupation has long ended and the sovereignty is back in the hands of the Iraqi 
people, U.S. forces, staff, and infrastructure are still desperately needed to ensure a minimum of 
security and stability in the country. Coalition troops are still present in large numbers in Iraq25 and 
they are struggling against a strong insurgency that has already killed more U.S. soldiers than the 
actual combat operations ever did.26 Sectarian violence has increased dramatically over the last 
months and has since then cost hundreds of lives. Many believe that Iraq is either on the verge of a 
civil war or already in it.27
B) THE COURT’S JURISDICTION, STRUCTURE & STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The erected court is not part of the regular judiciary system of Iraq. The Court has jurisdiction over 
Iraqis as well as non-Iraqi residents in Iraq28 accused of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes committed in the territory of Iraq or elsewhere since July 17, 1968 up until May 1, 2003, the 
date on which the formal occupation of Iraq began.29 In addition to these three crimes which are also 
enlisted in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), the 
Iraqi statute ads three further crimes30 derived out of and with reference to Iraqi law. These are
described as the “Intervention in the judiciary or the attempt to influence the functions of the 
judiciary”, “the wastage and squander of national resources” as well as “the abuse of position and 
the pursuit of policies that may lead to the threat of war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against 
an Arab country”.
25 Presently (April 2006) there are 133.000 American troops in Iraq, see Donald Rumsfeld,  Radio Interview on WABC 
News Talk Radio, N.Y., April 7, 2006, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2006/tr20060407-12841.html
26 See “A look at U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq”, N.Y. Times, November 17, 2005, also available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Iraq-US-Deaths.html. 
27 See e.g. “Iraq’s civil war nightmare”, BBC News, 23 February 2006, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4741616.stm, “Iraq in civil war, says former (Iraqi) Prime Minister”, BBC 
News, 19 March 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4821618.stm.  




 IHCC Statute, Articles 14.1, 14.2, 14.3
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The statute declares Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law for applicable31 and therefore relies on inquisitory
criminal proceeding as known in a lot of civil law countries, placing more power and responsibility 
on the judge compared to the typical common law adversary system. 
The trial is preceded by an investigation performed by an investigative Judge32, who also has the
power to question suspects, witnesses and victims in order to gather evidence. If the Investigative 
Judge finds a prima facie case as being established, the Judge will prepare an indictment and refer 
the case to the (trial) court33.
The trial chamber of the IHCC consists of five,34 the appeals chamber provided by the statute of nine 
judges.35 The Statute requires judges, members of the prosecution committee as well as the court’s 
staff36 and the principal defence lawyer of the accused37 to be Iraqi nationals.  Non-Iraqis may at the 
discretion of the court be approved as advisors to the court38, a non Iraqi judge may however sit in 
case a State is one of the parties and this is deemed necessary.39 No Non-Iraqi judge is currently 
sitting on the case before the court.40
The court is therefore a truly national court, not an international one as the ICTR, the ICTY or the 
ICC or what is referred to as a “hybrid court”, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone which 
31See IHCC Statute Article 16; Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law (English Translation) available at: 
http://www.iraqispecialtribunal.org/en/laws/LawOnCriminalProceedings.htm. 
32 IHCC Statute, Article 8.
33 IHCC Statute, Article 18.3.
34
 IHCC Statute, Article 4.1.
35
 IHCC Statute, Article 4.2.
36
 IHCC Statute, Article 28.
37
 IHCC Statute, Article 19.4 B.
38 IHCC Statute, Article 7.2 (general assistance), Article 8.9 (advisors for Investigative Judges) Article 9.7 (advisors for 
prosecutors).
39IHCC Statute, Article 3.5.
40
 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, supra note 1, at 6. 
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(being set up in cooperation with the U.N.) is composed of national as well as international judges, 
the latter being nominated by the Secretary General of the U.N.41
The penalties that are prescribed by the statute are those of Iraqi law,42 which does include the death 
penalty, usually administered by hanging.43 As Iraqi law does not include crimes like genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity and therefore does not provide for any sentences for perpetrators 
of these crimes, the Statute refers to the sentencing for the crimes of murder and rape which are 
prohibited under Iraqi law.44 These might be included in one of the crimes punishable under the 
Statute such as genocide. A premeditated killing or a killing as a result of the use of toxic substances 
or explosives is for example punishable by death under Iraqi law45 and the death penalty might 
consequently be imposed if these acts were committed by the accused as part of a war crime, 
genocide or crime against humanity. If the crime lacks any counterpart under Iraqi law the Court has 
to determine the punishment taking into account factors such as the gravity of the crime and 
individual circumstances.46
The trial is televised and broadcasted around the world with a twenty minute delay to allow 
censoring and avoid unforeseen events.47 Saddam originally had the right to represent himself (like 
Milosevic had) but according to the revised statute he now merely has got the right to “use a lawyer 
of his own choosing.48” As the other accused Saddam is represented by legal counsel of his choice in 
front of the court. As required by the statute his main defense counsel is Iraqi but he has a defense 
41
 For more information on the Special Court for Sierra Leone visit the official website under: http://www.sc-
sl.org/index.html.
42
 IHCC Statute, Article 24.1.
43 See “3 Set to Hang as Executions Return to Iraq”, N.Y. Times, August 17, 2005.
44
 IHCC Statute, Article 24.4.
45
 see Paragraph 406 (1) – a, b of the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969, available under:  
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi_Penal_Code_1969.pdf
46
 IHCC Statute, Article 24.5.
47 For a discussion whether the trial should be televised see Issue # 2, Grotian Moment Blog, supra note 6. 
48 IHCC Article 19.4 D.
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team comprised of international jurists, amongst them former U.S. attorney general Ramsey Clark,49
whose involvement has spurred quite some publicity.
C) THE CASE CURRENTLY BEFORE THE COURT
While Saddam is on trial in Iraq at the time of writing, he is not indicted for the major crimes he 
allegedly committed. Besides the ongoing torture and killing of dissidents, these would especially 
include the Anfal campaign50 (gassing of Iraqi Kurds – killing 50.000 - 100.000 including the 
gassing of the village of Halabja,51 killing 5000 civilians), the 1991 massacre after a Kurdish Shiite 
uprising,52 which was encouraged by the coalition forces pulling out of Iraq at the time, the assault 
on the Marsh Arabs (including the bombardment of villages, the employment of torture and 
disappearances, displacing at least 100.000),53 the waging of war against Iran employing chemical 
weapons and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. 
Instead Saddam is being tried for the alleged reprisals after a failed assassination attempt against
him. The incident took place in 1982 in the town of al-Dujail and supposedly led to summary 
executions, lengthy imprisonments and show trials with finally 148 people dead. 96 were hanged in 
Abu Ghraib prison and 46 died under torture, including four additional inmates who were 
accidentally added to the group.54 According to the Iraqi Tribunal this incident was chosen as it is 
49 See “Why I`m Willing to defend Hussein”, Ramsey Clark, L.A. Times, 24. January 2005, available at: 
http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0124-26.htm. 
50
 See „ The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds”, Human Rights Watch, New York 1993, available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/. 
51
 See “1988 Thousands die in Halabja gas attack”, BBC News, 16. March, 2005 available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/16/newsid_4304000/4304853.stm. 
52
 See Human Rights Watch, „The 1991 Uprising in Iraq And its Aftermath” available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm. 
53
 See “Iraq: Devastation of Marsh Arabs”, Human Rights Watch, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/01/iraq012503.htm. 
54
 “Prosecutors in Husein Case Tie Him to Order to Kill 148” NY Times, March 1, 2006, at A1.
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very well documented and a relatively clear and simple case.55 The prosecution introduced evidence 
directly linking Saddam to the executions, including a document which supposedly carried his 
signature, signing off the alleged Dujail perpetrators to be executed. It is however not clear with 
which crimes within the court’s jurisdiction Saddam has actually been charged as the indictments 
have not been made available to the public.56 Looking at the statute it is likely that the killing of 148 
men and boys might constitute a crime against humanity within the courts jurisdiction (Art 12 IHCC 
Statute), being “wilful murder” as part of a “widespread” but more likely “systematic attack”
directed against the civilian population.
Despite the argument that the Dujail case might be easy to prove, the decision to start the 
proceedings with this case is problematic. The IHCC Statute57 requires the punishment issued by the 
Court to be executed within 30 days of the date when the judgement becomes final. If Saddam was 
sentenced to death this would mean that he might never be put on trial for many of the most 
gruesome crimes he allegedly committed which would jeopardize the high hopes that accommodate 
the trial in terms of the country’s reconciliation. The injustice done to many victims by Saddam’s 
regime needs to be addressed by the criminal proceedings. Although it will hardly be possible to 
indict Saddam for every single criminal act, e.g. every torture or disappearance allegedly committed, 
major crimes amounting to crimes against humanity or genocide as punishable by the IHCC should 
be addressed before the court. It is doubtful to say the least that sentencing Sad dam for the killings in 
Dujail would sooth the wounds of those who lost relatives and friends in  the Anfal campaign. The 
pragmatic approach that the case of Dujail is supposed to be easier to prove and well documented is 
unlikely to be accepted by many victims. However, the court might try to find a way around the 
execution deadline found in Art. 27.2 and has indeed said that it plans up to 12 trials for Saddam.58
55See “Hussein’s First Trial Is Opening But Clarity May Still Be Far Off”, NY Times, October 18, 2005, at A11; “The 
first case: Dujail”, CBC News Online, October 18, 2005 at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/first_case.html, for 
a positive evaluation of this approach see Michael Scharf, Grotian Moment Blog, Issue #11 supra note 6.
56
 Human Rights Watch, Briefing Paper, supra note 1, at 6.
57 IHCC Statute Art. 27.2.
58 See „At Trial in Iraq, Witness Tell About Torture”, NY Times, 6, December 2005, at A 11.
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He has now been officially indicted for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed in an internal conflict for the Anfal campaign but it is still unclear when the proceedings 
in this case are going to start.59
To avoid Saddam’s execution to be carried out the court might for example declare an execution 
incompatible with an ongoing proceeding in another case before the court and interpret the provision 
in a way that the punishment must be executed within 30 days after a judgement has been issued and 
no other proceedings are pending. However this is an exception not provided for by the language of 
the statute and it might be criticised as arbitrary and not founded in law.
It should be noted that such an interpretation of the statute would also lead to a situation in which an 
accused sentenced to death has to wait for his penalty for what is likely to be several years during 
ongoing criminal proceedings. With regards to the extreme psychological stress for the convicted 
and the so called “death row phenomenon” this might amount to “cruel and inhumane treatment”
and has for example been declared incompatible with the European Human Rights Convention.60
The Human Rights Committee as the body responsible for interpreting the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political rights (ICCPR), which is applicable to Iraq61, has however declined to interpret 
the parallel provision in the ICCPR forbidding cruel and inhuman treatment in the same way. 62 The 
Committee did not want to lay pressure on states to encourage (speedy) executions. 
This dilemma – taking the ECHR point of view that long imprisonment on death row might amount
to cruel and inhumane treatment - would best be solved by excluding the death penalty from the 
penalties that might be imposed by the court. Although the death penalty is not prohibited by the 
59 See “Hussein Charged with Genocide in 50.000 deaths”, NY Times, April 5, 2006, at A6. 
60 Soering v. United Kingdom, ECHR (1989), Series A, No. 161.
61
 See list of ratifications/accessions in U.N. Treaty Database at 
http://untreaty.un.org/sample/EnglishInternetBible/partI/chapterIV/treaty5.asp
62 Johnson v. Jamaica (No.588/1004), UN Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/588/1994 (1996); For more information see e.g. Patrick 
Hudson, “Does the Death Row Phenomenon Violate a Prisoner’s Human Rights under Interantional Law”,   EJIL 
(2000), Vol. 11 No. 4, 833-856, also available under: http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol11/No4/110833.pdf.
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ICCPR there are strong international tendencies in outlawing it63 and it is banned from the Statutes 
of the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC. 
Along with Saddam seven more people are accused for their alleged involvement in the case, 
amongst them are Taha Jassin Ramadan64, Iraq’s former Vice-President, Barsan Ibrahim al-Tikriti,65
who is a younger half brother Saddam’s and former director of general intelligence (Mukhabarat) as 
well as Awad Hamed al-Bander,66 former chief justice of the Iraqi Revolutionary Court.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A) THE COURT ‘S LEGITIMACY
There are several legal treaties and norms applicable to the installation of the court as well as to the 
proceedings in front of it. During the war and especially the time of occupation, in which the original 
IST statute was promulgated and the tribunal was installed, the Geneva Conventions and the Hague 
Convention67 applied. The U.S. as well as Great Britain are parties to the Conventions.68 The Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (commonly referred to as 
IV. Geneva Convention)69 includes several provisions governing the powers of an occupying power.
Among these is Article 64 which provides that subject to security threats
63 See Protocol Nr.6 to the European Convention on Human Rights; 2. Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.
64
 See Trial Watch under: http://www.trial-ch.org/trialwatch/profiles/en/facts/p254.html. 
65 See Trial Watch under: http://www.trial-ch.org/trialwatch/profiles/en/facts/p147.html. 
66
 See Trial Watch under: http://www.trial-ch.org/trialwatch/profiles/en/facts/p407.html. 
67 Online available under: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm.
68 See Treaty Information of the International Committee of the Red Cross under: 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/Pays?ReadForm. 
69 On-line available under: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva07.htm. 
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“… and the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the tribunals of
the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered by said 
laws.”
Art. 43 of the Hague Regulations compels the occupying power to ensure public order and 
safety and to respect the laws in force in the country, unless absolutely prevented. 
It has been argued both for and against the legality of the installation of the tribunal based on these 
provisions.70 It is clear that the court is a tribunal which was newly created under the control of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority and it does not belong to the regular Iraqi legal system. The defence 
further more raises the argument that the occupation was illegal under international law and 
therefore the installation of the tribunal must also be illegal as it was set up through an official act
during the occupation.71
Defending the Court’s installation it has for example been claimed that the tribunal was necessary as 
a measure to “restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety” as provided by Art. 42 
of the Hague Regulations just as the Security Council used its obligation to “maintain or restore 
international peace and security” to create the ICTR and ICTY under its Chapter VII UNC powers.72
Notwithstanding this dispute the current tribunal receives strong legitimacy through the fact that its 
statute has subsequently been amended and approved by the Iraqi Transitional Assembly. The court 
is also expressly mentioned and empowered by the Iraqi Constitution.73 Adopted on October 15,
2005, its Article 130 reads as follows:
70
 See Bassouini supra note 6,  136; Michael Newton, supra note 6, at 7.   
71 Najib Nuaimi, member of the defense team, cited in “Witness at Hussein trial describes alleged torture” CNN,  
December 6, 2005, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/12/05/saddam.hussein.trial/.
72 Michael Newton, supra note 6, at 7.
73 English version of the constitution available at: http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9719734/. 
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“The Iraq High Criminal Court shall continue its duties as an independent judicial body, 
in examining the crimes of the defunct dictatorial regime and its symbols. The Council of 
Representatives shall have the right to dissolve by law the Iraqi High Criminal Court 
after the completion of its work.”
There might still be doubts whether the Iraqis really had the free choice to abandon the court
had they wanted to do so. After all, it had been set up, financed and provided with a full legal 
framework and the proceedings had already started. Furthermore the support in troops and the 
infrastructural help Iraq receives by the U.S. is substantive and vital for the country.
Nevertheless the court has been approved by the Iraqi people through a direct vote in adopting 
the constitution as well as through the Transitional Assembly, a body elected by the Iraqi 
people, when it amended the Court’ s Statute.  
B) JURISDICTION, NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE & HEAD OF STATE  
IMMUNITY 
There is little doubt that Iraq has got jurisdiction to prosecute Saddam. Whereas it is generally 
recognised that a country can exercise so called universal jurisdiction to trial perpetrators at least for 
crimes against humanity and genocide74 there is no need to rely on this principle here, as Iraq is 
putting Saddam on trial itself. Under international law a country generally has jurisdiction especially 
for crimes committed on its territory, by its citizens or against its citizens. In the case of Saddam 
there are therefore numerous links which give Iraq jurisdiction  over Saddam: the fact that Saddam is 
an Iraqi is a sufficient link to the country for the country to prosecute him for any committed crimes. 
Most of the crimes were also allegedly committed in Iraq and further more against Iraqis, eac h factor
independently would also grant the country jurisdiction. 
74 See Bassiouni, “Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes, Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice”, 
42 Va. J. Int’l L. 81 2001-2002. 
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One might wonder if Saddam and his co defendants can be tried for crimes that have not been 
prohibited by the Iraqi criminal code such as genocide or crimes against humanity as it is a basic 
principle of international law that a crime and its punishment have to be proscribed by law before the 
crime has been committed (“nullum crimen sine lege” / “nulla poena sine lege”). But although this 
might have still been doubtful during the days of Nuremberg, it is clear that crimes against humanity 
and genocide as well as war crimes are prescribed by (international) law today. Genocide is 
especially prohibited by the Genocide Convention to which Iraq is a party75 and war crimes are 
covered by the Geneva Conventions signed by Iraq.76 Both prohibitions are also recognised by 
customary international law just as the prohibition of crimes against humanity is.77 That an 
individual can be put on trial based on these international norms has been clearly established and is 
enshrined in customary international law today looking at the precedents of Nuremberg and Tokyo
as well as those set through the ICTR and the ICTY. The 100 ratifications of the ICC statute78
provide further evidence of general support to prosecute the aforementioned international crimes. 
As the issue of head of state immunity has been brought up in connection with Saddam’s case79 it 
shall also be addressed here briefly. Looking at the developments in international law especially 
during the last decade it is now pretty clear that Saddam could not raise the defence of head of state 
immunity under international law was he facing an international tribunal or foreign court. Head of 
state immunity is derived from the state’s sovereignty which generally is protected against intrusions 
or aggression from other sovereign states under international law. But as Saddam’s home country
Iraq is putting him on trial, the discussion that arouse around the planned trial of Pinochet in Spain, 
Milosevic in The Hague or the Ex-Rwandan Prime Minister Kambanda before the ICTR does not 
75 Accession: 20. January 1959, see UN Treaty Collection under http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty1gen.htm. 
76 See Database of the ICRC http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/Pays?ReadForm&c=IQ. 
77
 See Bassiouini, supra note 73. 
78 As of 14. November 2005, see http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html. 
79 See e.g. Linda Malone, “Does Saddam have Head of State Immunity”, Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial 
Blog”, Issue #7, supra note 6.
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have to be repeated here. There might be a problem of head of state immunity granted by Iraqi law. 
Such a national immunity would however not impose any restrictions on other states to persecute 
Saddam and Iraq would infringe its international obligations arising out of the cited conventions by 
not putting Saddam on trial for the international crimes prohibited by them. 
C) FAIR TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
Iraq (just as the U.S. and the United Kingdom are) is a party to the International Covenant for 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)80 which in its Art. 14 sets numerous basic minimal 
requirements for a fair trial such as the presumption of innocence, the right of the accused to be 
informed promptly of any charges against him or the right to receive a trial without undue 
delay. 
The statute and its application have been closely analysed by Amnesty International81 and Human 
Rights Watch82 who both have criticized various shortcomings. It however has to be acknowledged 
as a starting point that the IHCC statute does include the basic guarantees requested by the “list” in 
the ICCPR.83
Nevertheless insufficient access of the accused to their defense counsels during the investigation 
phase has been criticised as well as a lack of equality of arms and adequate time and facilities for 
preparation. Human Rights Watch has pointed out84 that the statute’s provision requesting the lead 
defence council to be an Iraqi national effectively excludes any lawyer with experience in the 
80 See U.N. Treaty Database at http://untreaty.un.org/sample/EnglishInternetBible/partI/chapterIV/treaty5.asp. 
81Amnesty International report, supra note 4,  this analysis is however not absolutely accurate any more as Amnesty 
International concentrated on the old IST statute before it was amended by the Transitional National Assembly.
82 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, supra note 1.
83 See Amnesty International Report, supra note 4.
84 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, supra note 1, at 13.
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complex procedures connected to crimes of such a magnitude as genocide and crimes against 
humanity (e.g. gained through working at the ICTY or ICTR). 
It has also been criticised that the tribunal does not require the guilt of the accused to be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, as typically required in common law countries and as required in front of 
the ICTY, ICTR or ICC.85 Instead the Tribunal will find a verdict “based on the extent to which it is 
satisfied by the evidence presented (…).“ 86 On the other hand it has been said that the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard is unheard of in many civil law countries.87 It all in all will heavily 
depend on how the IHCC will apply the standard provided by the statute.  The same is true for the 
application and interpretation of the enlisted Iraqi crimes in the tribunal’s jurisdiction which due to 
their extremely vague and broad wording are open to very arbitrary interpretation. 
Art. 14 ICCPR further more includes the general requirement of:  
“a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law.”
In this regard major problems arise especially out of the highly instable security situation in Iraq. 
With hardly a day without terrorist attacks that have even been precisely targeted against members 
of the defence, fair trial proceedings are much harder to guarantee. Human Rights watch pointed out 
the “serious obstacles that the defence may encounter in locating and protecting witnesses on behalf 
of defendants, obtaining access to documents and securing the attendance of international experts it 
may wish to call in support.”88
85 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 87 (a), ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 87 (a), Rome 
Statute, Art.66 (3).
86
 Code of Criminal Procedure, Paragraph 213, available at: 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi_Criminal_Procedure_Code.pdf. 
87
 See Bassouini in Comments on Issue #18 in Grotian Moment Blog, supra note 6. 
88 Id.
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And even with considerable protection offered by the Court employing U.S. or U.S. paid security 
forces the defence is likely to encounter problems as it will often need to rely on people who 
strongly oppose the coalition’s involvement as well as the IHCC and its jurisdiction.
Due to the highly insecure situation the court has to rely even more on coalition forces and foreign 
personnel that may at least be perceived as biased and having an own interest at stake in the 
proceedings. As weapons of mass destructions were never found and the ties between Al Qaida and 
Saddam were at best very remote the only remaining justification that might be accepted by the 
public is the argument that the intervention was necessary to stop ongoing and massive human rights 
violations committed by the dictator now on trial. An acquittal how ever unlikely would therefore be 
detrimental for the coalition’s remaining moral justifications for the war.89
In response to the killings of defense attorneys, the Iraqi Bar temporarily boycotted the court and the 
defense several times requested the trial to be moved to a location outside Iraq.90 The court has 
however rejected and dismissed the motions filed, apparently without providing any written 
explanation or statement elaborating on its ruling.
The decision to use a purely national tribunal composed solely of Iraqi judges poses more problems. 
The impartiality of the judges as well as their legal expertise is doubtful. It has to be kept in mind 
that the court is applying international criminal law when it considers war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide which are no easy and clear cut provisions and the statute itself points out 
that the court may resort to the decisions of International Criminal Courts in interpreting these 
89 Whether there would have been a legal justification for the use of force against Iraq based on the controversial 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention is highly doubtful; even more so in the light of the necessary “re-labelling” of the 
military action into a humanitarian mission after no weapons of mass destruction were found.       
90 Michael Newton, Grotian Moment Blog, “Are the Murders of Defense Councel going to derail the trial ? Should the 
IST relocate outside Iraq ?”, Issue # 19, supra note 6. 
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crimes.91 Although their knowledge and intelligence has been praised by those U.S. experts in 
international law chosen by the Department of Defence to train them92, they will surely not have the 
expertise somebody would have who worked in this area for years or was even involved in legal 
disputes before the ICTY or ICTR.  Just as somebody might explain you in great detail how to drive 
a car this obviously does not substitute own practice or ensure that the trainee will actually do a good 
job. Furthermore the people who trained the judges (and whom the judges might rely on when 
difficult legal questions arise) were chosen by one of the parties involved in the conflict. Even if 
these experts did not present a biased view, the way they were chosen is open to critique and does 
not help to promote the perception of fair and impartial tribunal judges. According to the New York 
Times some of the trial judges are also relying on American Officials to arrange green cards for 
them to move to the U.S. after the trials are over, as taking part in the trial would end any prospect of 
leading a normal life in Iraq93. 
The judges might also have somehow been personally affected by Saddam’s suppressive reign. The 
court has been subject to a de-Ba’thification and the Statute excludes any person who has previously 
been a member of the disbanded Ba’th Party from working on the court.94 Exclusion on the basis of 
Ba’th party membership makes it more likely that the remaining judges have either directly or 
indirectly been personally subject to the regime’s suppression. As Professor Newton who took part 
in training the Judges points out in connection to the “pool of Iraqis that were initially considered for 
various positions inside the Iraqi Special Tribunal” – surprisingly without addressing the threat to 
impartiality – :
91
 IHCC Article 17 (4)
92 See Michael Scharf,  Grotian Moment Blog, “Can Saddam Hussein get a fair trial ?”, Issue # 8,  supra note 6.
93
“Hussein Lawyers Refuse To Work With Iraqi Court”, NY Times, October 27, 2005, at A 14.
94 IHCC Statute, Article 33. 
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“As a microcosm of Iraqi society, the overwhelming majority of that original group of 
96 legal professionals had suffered the loss of immediate family members to the 
criminal act of the regime. One judge was the only survivor of seven brothers.95”
A judge who is personally involved to such an extent is obviously in great danger of rendering a 
biased decision not based on the rule of law. Rule 7.4 of the Rules of Evidence does however require 
a judge to withdraw from any case in which his impartiality or independence may reasonably be 
doubted and Rule 8 allows any party to challenge a judge’s impartiality. Although these rules are an 
important tool to help to ensure an impartial trial, they will also need to be applied in a manner that 
will ensure impartiality and not allow picking judges, that have suffered the loss of family members 
or close friends to the acts of the regime.
In a personal talk with Professor Newton he assured me that most of the judges in the original pool 
were later disqualified by the Iraqis as they were afraid of a possible threat to impartiality. 
However, the newly presiding judge on the court, Judge Raouf Abdul Rahman is a Kurd from the 
city of Halabja, which is the city that was so severely targeted by Saddam during the Anfal 
campaign. According to Professor Newton, Judge Raouf was originally even supposed to preside 
over the Anfal trial before he was redirected to be the new presiding judge in the current proceedings 
when Judge Amin decided to resign. 
When the presiding judge Rizgar Amin resigned early this year, he highlighted another threat to the 
trial’s fairness: political interference in the courts independence. As pointed out, Saddam has been 
declared guilty by high officials such as the Iraqi President Jalal Talabani who wanted the trial to 
start as soon as possible and said: “Saddam is a war criminal and he deserves to be executed 20 
95 Michael Newton, supra note 6, at 4.
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times a day for his crimes against humanity” or Abdul Aziz Hakim, leader of the largest political 
party in Iraq, according to witch “this criminal deserves the death penalty, the highest 
punishment.”96 This fact by itself would not be so troubling as long as there was no actual 
interference with the court’s work. But as membership in the Ba’th Party was a prerequisite for 
admission to judicial training under the former government97 the IHCC Statute’s Art. 33 de-
ba’thification provision would exclude most qualified lawyers from the court and it apparently has 
not been enforced strictly but rather selectively by Iraq’s new rulers and was employed to pressurize 
the court.98 When 19 members of the court were supposed to be excluded under this provision Iraq’s 
president interfered to block the effort.99 Others have however been expelled from the court under 
this rule. When Judge Rizgar Amin, the presiding judge, resigned, he complained about 
governmental interference after he had been repeatedly criticized by Iraqi politicians for being to 
lenient with Saddam.100  The judge that was actually supposed to take his seat from within the 
judiciary panel apparently was sidestepped under Art. 33 and Judge Raouf became the new presiding 
judge.101 Of the panel of 5 judges who started out on the trial 3 have been replaced.102 This sort of 
selective enforcement poses a great risk to the trial’s fairness and the independence and impartiality 
of the court.
So is the trial fair? A final assessment is hardly possible at this point in time but it is clear that the 
trial is facing grave challenges and the odds are not in favour of fair proceedings. Although there are 
visible efforts to arrange for a fair trial, the security situation the trial is been held in, which allowed 
for the assassination of members of the court and the defence team, the pressure from inside Iraq, the 
executive’s involvement and the reliance on the coalition to conduct the trial as well as the lack of 
96 See Talabani cited in Chicago Tribune and Hakim cited in Washington Post, both supra note 6.
97
 See “Hussein’s First Trial Is Opening But Clarity May Still Be Far Off”, NY Times, October 18, 2005, at A11. 
98 See NY Times id.
99
“Iraqi Leader Vows to Block Purges on Hussein Tribunal”, NY Times, July 29, 2005, at A9.
100
“Iraq tries to convince Saddam judge to stay” Reuters, Jan 15, 2006, available at: 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10842074/from/RL.1/; “Kurd to Preside at Hussein Trial, Set to Resume today”, NY 
Times, January 24, 2006, at. A12. 
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“Saddam Hussein trial is postponed”, BBC News, January 24, 2006, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4641958.stm.
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experienced judges in international law and their training through the U.S. have created a situation 
which is very far from being ideal
D) THE PERCEPTION OF THE TRIAL
In the light of the aforementioned the trial is not only in danger of actually not complying with the 
ICCPR standard for a fair trial but it might also not be perceived as fair by the Iraqi as well as by the 
world audience. As pointed out in the introduction the court needs to serve different purposes, 
besides helping to deter other heads of state around the globe from engaging in similar actions there 
is the hope that it might reconcile victims, offer public acknowledgment of crimes committed and 
serve as a model trial for the post Saddam Iraqi justice system. Especially concerning the latter 
aspects it is not only important that the court will actually hold a fair trial but that this trial will also 
be perceived as such.103 Even if close scrutiny might one day reveal that the procedures were 
actually fair and in conformity with international standards, a trial that is not believed to be so by the 
overwhelming majority of the audience watching, will leave the victims unsatisfied, will not 
reconcile the country or provide for a positive new start. If people end up thinking of this trial as 
victor’s justice, where the powerful simply hold a mock trial over the imprisoned and per se guilty, it 
will be a failure. At best the perception might change over the years and essays and books written 
might prove that the trial - if so - was actually fair but this will be too late to achieve many of the 
goals set. 
The trials shortcomings and possible stumbling blocks have been pointed out and the audience 
seems to be highly sceptical about it. While reactions concerning the trial are mixed, in Iraq some 
still support Saddam whereas many others want him to be executed immediately most of the 
reactions directly addressing the fairness of the trial are troubling. Far from being a representative 
study - which would be worth undertaking – you find the following statements about the trial: “It`s 
103 See also Goldstone, supra note 7 at 1504.
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a historic farce, not a historic trial”104, “He won’t get a fair trial in Iraq”105, “This is just a show to 
distract the Iraqi people”106, “Everyone agrees, ask anyone you want if it's a fair trial. They'll all 
say it's unprofessional. It's simply a farce. I've never seen in my life such a trial107.” “These are the 
occupiers so if you're talking about public perception, this is what comes across into homes.108” By 
referring to his contacts in Iraq Professor Bassiouni points out: “My impression is that there are two 
distinct scenes that are playing out contemporaneously. The first is the witnesses’ testimony which 
is touching people’s hearts, and the defendants and their lawyers, which are playing on national 
pride since the trial is seen in part as being the U.S. vs. Saddam. In short, it is like having a 2-ring 
circus.”109
G) ALTERNATIVES – PRESENT & PAST
Looking at the fair trial pitfalls of the current tribunal, the question arises whether there were any 
alternative venues to prosecute Saddam as well as what can still be done to improve the present 
situation.
As a starting point the trial could be moved away from Baghdad and outside of Iraq. Although a trial 
in the country where the crimes were committed, close to the general public, the victims, witnesses 
and the locations of the crimes is generally favourable to a trial held abroad as it also offers the 
additional advantage of “facility building,”, Baghdad does not do the trial any good. As pointed out,
the lack of security in Iraq and its capital leads to insufficient protection for defence lawyers, judges, 
104 Furad Saadadeen, 35, Iraqi Resident, quoted by NY Times, “Iraqis Watch the Trial on TV, With Emotions Running 
High”, October 20, 2005, at A12. 
105
 Ismail Maki, Iraqi, quoted by AP, Ocober 18, 2005, MSNBC article available at: 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9742717/from/RL.2/. 
106
 Iraqi quoted by AP, id.
107
 Jordanian quoted by PBS, December 13, 2005, “Jordanian view of Saddam’s Trial”, available at:  
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec05/jordan_12-13.html (according to the report general support 
was high for Saddam’s eventual punishment in Jordan, however there was no belief that justice was been done by the 
court in Baghdad running the risk that Saddam’s reputation was enhanced rather than sullied by the legal proceedings). 
108 George Hawatmeh, former editor of the Jordan times, quoted by PBS, id.
109 Cherif Bassiouni in the Grotian Moment Trial Blog, Essay # 22, supra note 6.
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witnesses, court personal, international advisors and (foreign) experts which threatens to undermine 
the trial’s fairness. Especially international experts and advisors might be reluctant to travel to 
Baghdad to testify. Also, with security the way it is, the trial is already removed from the public as it 
is held in a fenced of zone, which is heavily guarded, allowing only restricted access to the court.110
Further more the political pressure is high on the court just as the level of reliance on coalition forces 
to conduct the proceedings. 
It has however been argued that no place is really safe from terrorist attacks111 and that moving the 
proceedings would be “subordinating civilized society to the forces of anarchy and lawlessness.112” 
And although the deaths of the defense counsels were tragic, they themselves had decided to have 
their names and faces broadcasted during the trial and denied security protection offered by the court 
through U.S. forces.113 The argument that protection by the court might lead to an interference with 
the work done by the defense as their every step would be followed by coalition security forces –
very likely perceived as biased by the defense and the witnesses it wants to rely on - has been 
rejected with the argument that in a civil law system such as Iraq, the neutral investigative judge has 
already conducted the whole investigation and the lawyers therefore need not do so themselves..114
Finally it has been said that moving the trial would delay it and pose serious problems to the defense 
to present their witnesses to the court. 115
But none of these arguments are convincing. The argument that moving the trial might seem like 
surrendering to terrorist attacks, is a dangerous one when talking about an individual’s right to a fair 
trial. It is against the very idea of human rights as rights of individuals to decide not to move a trial 
out of a symbolic reason – not to give in to terrorists - while thereby sacrificing a fair trial for the 
110 See Washington Post, supra note 8.
111 Michael Newton, Grotian Moment Blog, “Are the Murders of Defense Councel going to derail the trial ? Should the 
IST relocate outside Iraq ?”, Issue # 19, supra note 6.
112 Michael Newton, id.
113 Michael Scharf, id. 
114
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individual concerned. And even though the Iraqi system employs an “objective investigative judge” 
it is of course part of a good attorney’s job to dig out as much evidence as he can to support his 
client, to find witnesses not found by the judge and move every stone possible to prove his case. 
Maybe in a stable environment, when trying an easy case, the argument that the neutral investigative 
judge has done all necessary discovery deserves some credit, but surely not in cases of this 
magnitude. The proceedings before the ICTY and the ICTR have shown that trials for genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity are no easy cases. They involve thousands of pages of 
documents and by affecting many peoples’ lives, they involve so much evidence and potential 
witnesses that by no means an attorney can assume to have all relevant documents on his table when 
seeing the investigative judge’s results. And whereby it is probably true that no place is absolutely 
save when it comes to terrorist attacks, a place like Dubai116 surely is much safer than terror stricken 
Baghdad with a strong insurgency still fighting coalition forces and daily bombings. 
Although the ICTR and ICTY have been criticised for the problems resulting out of their distant 
location away from the place where the crimes have been committed they surely did prove that such 
trials are possible and that an adequate defense can be guaranteed. Witnesses are flown in to Arusha, 
Tansania where the ICTR sits.117 Furthermore the decision not to accept protection by the defence 
counsels can not function as an excuse to ignore the danger that these attacks pose for a fair trial. 
The defense does not recognise the tribunal as legitimate and accuses the occupation as being 
illegal.118 It does cause severe problems for a defense lawyer to take this position and nevertheless 
accept protection offered to him by this very institution, especially as a reliance on the courts 
protection would be clearly visible for everyone (the heavy armoured cars and up to 15 body 
guards119 can hardly be hidden). If the defense prefers to move the trial this should therefore be 
seriously considered by the court. 
116
 Proposed by Laura Dickinson, Grotian Moment Blog, Issue #19, supra note 6.
117
 See also Goldstone, supra note 7, at 1497.
118 See for example posting by member of the defense team Dr. Curtis Doebbler at http://www.uruknet.info/?p=9016.
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Aspects criticised also arise out of the heavy involvement of the coalition which could have been 
avoided by more and heavy international support. A prosecution before the newly created 
International Criminal Court (ICC) was however not an option as the ICC Statute does not allow 
prosecutions for crimes committed before it came into force120 on 01. July 2002.121
But there were two other alternatives: the first one was the creation of a hybrid tribunal relying on a 
mixture of Iraqi nationals and international legal experts from around the world for the positions of 
judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys. The original IST statute, subsequently amended, at least 
made the appointment of international legal experts obligatory, even though only as advisors to the 
court. But just as in Sierra Leone the tribunal could have been set up in cooperation between the 
U.N. and Iraq. Heavy U.N. instead of U.S. involvement would certainly have given the tribunal more 
legitimacy in fact as – and of equal and great importance - in perception. However it has been 
claimed that Iraq was willing to prosecute Saddam by itself and furthermore that Iraq insisted on the 
death penalty which would not have been available with U.N. involvement. Although this might be 
true there are obvious similarities with Rwanda which also wanted to have the prosecutions take 
place within its country and favoured the death penalty.122 A trial in Rwanda was however 
considered to be impossible by the Security Council and in the light of the clear fair-trial provisions 
of the ICCPR, the role-model character of the proceedings and the reconciliation of the country, one 
can only agree with Justice Goldstone who pointed out:
“either you have fair trials or you do not have trials at all”.123
120 Art. 11 section 1 of the ICC Statute, available at: http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm. 
121 See also statement of the ICC president, “International Court’s Canadian president says court can’t try Saddam”, AP, 
November 07.2005, Canadian Press article available at:  http://www.canada.com/news/world/story.html?id=c9e82d29-
daee-415d-98db-fbdf41a1b689.  
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If Iraq can’t guarantee a fair trial by itself it should therefore not hold the trial.
The comparison with Rwanda highlights the second possibility: the establishment of an ad hoc 
tribunal by the Security Council under its Chapter VII power as in the cases of the ICTR and the 
ICTY. There has been criticism about these tribunals as trials were lengthy and costly, too remote 
from the victims and the public but there was no opposition to their fairness. These tribunals are also 
less likely as being perceived as victor’s justice but rather as part of an evolving international 
criminal legal order. A trial of this importance would have been worth a new tribunal which 
arguably would also have led to a greater deterrence for any other potential international criminal as 
it would have resembled a further step towards a truly international criminal system in which 
perpetrators who have committed international crimes are prosecuted by an international forum.
Although these alternatives were considered, the current U.S. administration did not want to follow 
this path and from an early stage on was opposed to the idea of an international tribunal but preferred 
a national tribunal, possibly also because this it could help fashion and influence.124
IV. CONCLUSION 
Whereas the current tribunal might be called legitimate after its “adoption” through the Iraqi people 
and it can exercise jurisdiction over the ex-dictator it might not be able to conduct a fair trial. Many 
already believe that it actually does not do so. 
The lack of a broad international involvement in the invasion of Iraq, in the installation of the court 
and in the trial’s conduct which might eventually lead to the imposition of the death penalty -
widely abolished throughout this world’s democracies - has apparently also led to a broad 
international opposition against the proceedings. As U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice 
124 Bassiouni, supra note 6, at 118. 
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pointed out, there was an effective boycott of the trial.125 This boycott will surely not promote the 
perception of the trial’s success or the court’s legitimacy and is regrettable when looking at the 
importance of the trial. 
An international tribunal or one with major international involvement conducting the trial outside 
Iraq could have avoided many of the problems the local national court is facing today and it 
therefore would have been the better solution. Even though the road to the ICC was barred in order 
to prosecute Saddam, his trial in Baghdad highlights the advantages of an international court. 
Growing acceptance of this assessment might lead to the paradox situation in which the decision for 
a national tribunal without broad international support or involvement in Baghdad could finally end
up promoting the idea of a strong international criminal court. 
125
“Rice hits boycott of trial of Saddam”, The Washington Times, December 14, 2005, available at 
http://washingtontimes.com/world/20051213-100045-8045r.htm. 
